Commercial Spent Fuel Reprocessing
Reversing a thirty-year practice of not separating nuclear bomb-grade material from nuclear waste due to cost and proliferation concerns, the Bush Administration in February 2006 unveiled its plans for reprocessing U.S. and foreign nuclear waste as part of its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program. Dubbed a non-proliferation initiative that will address the problem of nuclear weapons, GNEP contains several useful provisions for reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation such as the establishment of an international fuel bank by supplier countries and the take-back of spent fuel from recipient countries. However, as part of this initiative, the Bush administration is forging ahead with plans to build a full-scale commercial reprocessing plant and fast reactor that would separate from nuclear waste the material necessary to make nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy is seeking sites for these full-scale facilities even before the commercially-viable and proliferation-resistant technology is available which would be many decades at best. This effort to reprocess nuclear waste at a time when the United States is seeking to prevent the spread of this sensitive technology weakens nuclear non-proliferation efforts to stop other countries from engaging in this practice and would make available material to terrorists seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.
What Is Reprocessing?
Reprocessing separates, or can be readily adopted to separate, bomb-grade plutonium from nuclear waste to use in making fuel for nuclear power plants. For example, India and North Korea have used reprocessing to produce nuclear weapons. Reprocessing alone does not solve the problem of nuclear waste. The "re-use" of plutonium is done through transmutation in fast reactors. However, the technology that would make this process commercially viable and proliferation-resistant is not currently available and would take decades to develop at best.
Reprocessing Increases The Risk That Bomb-Grade Material Will Fall Into Terrorist Hands
Because reprocessing separates material that could be used to make nuclear weapons or could be modified to use in nuclear weapons from the highly radioactive waste, this process makes it much easier for terrorists to steal the material. As long as the plutonium remains in the nuclear waste, it is extremely difficult to steal because of the intense radiation it emits and cannot be used to make a nuclear weapon. By engaging in steps that remove many of the necessary barriers that prevent terrorist from acquiring material for a bomb, reprocessing increases the risk that dangerous material will fall into the hands of terrorists.
Reprocessing Weakens Us Non-Proliferation Efforts
US reprocessing would significantly undermine nuclear non-proliferation efforts as the Administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency seek to curb the spread of reprocessing in others countries. By taking the position that certain countries can engage in this process while prohibiting all others from doing so because of the risk that they might use the material to acquire nuclear weapons directly undermines decades of nuclear non-proliferation efforts. As an example, US decision to abandon reprocessing and international pressure convinced countries such as Germany and South Korea not to reprocess.
Reprocessing Is Expensive
Reprocessing is extremely expensive. A 1996 National Academy of Sciences report concluded that reprocessing would cost tax payers at least an additional $100 billion for waste disposal. The Department of Energy has not released any lifecycle cost estimate for reprocessing and transmutation since a 1999 report that estimated the lifecycle cost of reprocessing and transmutation at $280 billion. Transmutation also requires fast reactors, rather than the proliferation-resistant light water reactors that the United States and most countries with nuclear power currently use. These fast reactors are more expensive and pose many safety risks because they use a liquid metal coolant, rather than water. Most fast reactors in the world have been shut down because of safety and operating problems and local opposition.
Reprocessing Is Not A Solution For The Nuclear Waste Problem
Reprocessing in France and Japan fails to deal with the waste problem, resulting in worse waste streams than nuclear waste that is not reprocessed. The promise that reprocessing and transmutation will address the nuclear waste problem is still an illusion as the technology is not available despite years of research. At a minimum, the Department of Energy should continue with lab-bench research rather than rushing forward and building commercial-scale facilities when the technology remains decades away at best.
Past Attempts At Reprocessing Have Been Abandoned
The United States stopped reprocessing after six years in 1972 and subsequently has not used reprocessing due to proliferation concerns and the associated high financial costs. President Ford declared a policy of no-reprocessing in 1976 which was codified by President Carter. While President Reagan repealed the ban on reprocessing, there has been no reprocessing in the United States due to cost and proliferation concerns. In 1972, the only operating reprocessing plant in the United States, located in West Valley, NY, was shut down. It reprocessed only 1-year's worth of nuclear waste in its six years of operation and the plant left major environmental contamination, the commercial reprocessing part of which is costing over $5 billion to clean-up.
Congress And Funding
The main reasons certain Members of Congress included these provisions in the bill is their perception that reprocessing will significantly reduce the radioactive waste bound for a geological repository at Yucca Mountain and eliminate the need to site a second repository, and the perception that reprocessing is successful in Europe and Japan. However, such technology is not currently available and likely decades away.
Despite independent reports such as the 1996 National Academy of Sciences report and studies by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Insitute of Technology cautioning against the cost and risks for the spread of nuclear weapons material, and despite technological challenges, the Bush administration is seeking $250 million in FY 2007 (and over $5 billion on the next five years). The Senate provided the full amount but the House cut over half the funding to $120 million. This difference will be resolved in conference.
