Blow Up This Nuclear Deal
Published by TomPaine.com on November 16, 2006
Despite having pursued a covert nuclear weapons program for decades while most countries foreswore the right to acquire nuclear weapons, India is out of the nuclear dog house. In the few legislative days left in the 109th Congress, the lame-duck Republican Senate is expected to vote on the Bush administration's proposed nuclear deal with India, creating an exception in long-standing U.S. laws to allow nuclear trade with India.
Cooperation between the United States and India--two world powers that share broad common goals--across many sectors is crucial and beneficial to both countries. However, cooperation based on nuclear exports to India would have long-lasting negative consequences for the United States' ability to maintain a strong and viable norm against the spread of nuclear weapons, especially given the challenge of the recent North Korean nuclear weapon test and escalating tensions with Iran. This proposed deal fails to bring India under the nonproliferation treaty umbrella, torpedoes nonproliferation efforts, risks causing an arms race in South Asia, and all the while fail to address India's energy needs effectively and fulfill U.S. strategic goals.
The legislation under consideration modifies laws established in 1978 as a direct response to India's 1974 nuclear explosive tests in which India misused a reactor and heavy water provided by the United States and Canada in 1959 for peaceful purposes (the misuse continues to this day). The proposed change would allow the United States to engage in nuclear trade with India even though India does not submit all its facilities to inspection and still remains well outside the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream. Under the agreement, India could continue to increase its nuclear weapons capability, and India refuses to undertake meaningful steps such as signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and stopping the production of material for nuclear weapons, as the five recognized nuclear weapon states--United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China--have done.
In fact, by enabling India to import uranium fuel for its nuclear power plants, the agreement would allow India to free up its limited supplies of indigenous uranium (which India currently must divide between its weapons production and electricity generation) for dedicated use in its military program. According to estimates by a former Indian intelligence official and by the International Panel on Fissile Material among others, India could boost its nuclear weapons production from its current production capability of six to 12 weapons a year to 40 to 50 weapons a year with the agreement. Thus, if the agreement allows India to significantly expand its nuclear weapon arsenal, India's promise to open 14 of its reactors to inspection (with no guarantee of placing future reactors under safeguards) becomes irrelevant. In addition, by separating plutonium--a weapons-usable material--from the nuclear waste resulting from the fuel provided to India under the agreement as India intends to do, India would be able to build up stockpiles of plutonium and expertise that it could use later for its weapons if it violates or abrogates the agreement.
Under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the key benefits reserved for non-nuclear weapon states in good standing is access to nuclear cooperation for electricity production. In exchange for this benefit (added to the assurance that most countries will not pursue nuclear weapons) over 180 non-nuclear weapon countries under the NPT promised to give up forever the right to acquire nuclear weapons. Since the current proposed legislation will allow India to reap the benefits of nuclear cooperation while not only retaining its nuclear weapon arsenal but moreover acquiring the capability to expand its nuclear weapons production, the deal will significantly undermines the global nonproliferation framework. The NPT has been the world's primary line of defense against the spread of nuclear weapons for over 35 years, keeping the number of countries with nuclear weapon arsenals under ten. Therefore, creating an exception for India creates a dangerous double-standard that may prove extremely deleterious for the delicate balance of benefits and obligations that underpin the NPT and its global nonproliferation framework.
Additionally, creating an exception for India may open the door to further dangerous exceptions. The perception that India will gain increased nuclear weapons capability as a result of the deal risks leading Pakistan to further ramp up its nuclear weapons production. Pakistan has already approached China for a similar deal. Also U.S. leadership has already contributed to Russia and China halting some of their questionable nuclear exports that undermined the norm against non-proliferation. However, now Russia and France, which are best placed to benefit from this new market for nuclear trade, are eager to export nuclear material and technology to India; and China may be more inclined to help Pakistan under a similar exception.
The timing of the deal is also questionable. Several Indian companies and nuclear scientists have been sanctioned for transferring missile and sensitive technology and knowledge to Iran. In July, the administration announced new sanctions against two additional Indian companies, just days after the House of Representatives voted to approve its version of the nuclear cooperation deal, unaware of the impending sanctions. In addition, India has conducted tests of nuclear-capable missiles in July and most recently again in October. More importantly, the deal comes at a critical juncture for negotiations with Iran and North Korea. Allowing an exception for India on one hand, while on the other requiring that Iran give up its nuclear ambitions and North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, undermines international leverage in the on-going negotiations with these two problem states.
While India's booming population entails obvious growing energy needs, focusing U.S. assistance on non-nuclear energy sources would be a cheaper and more effective alternative than providing India with assistance for nuclear power. India's ability to meet its ambitious nuclear power goals seems overly optimistic given its prior record of failing to meet its objectives and given India's lack of institutional experience with private investment in the nuclear sector. Regardless, India will continue to depend on coal and oil. Investing in energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, distributed energy and modernizing India's electric grid hold far more promise for efficient results.
While the Bush administration hopes that this deal with result in a geo-strategic partnership to strengthen India in the face of perceived U.S. rivals China and Iran, this outcome is unlikely given India's growing economic ties with those countries. China is expected to rival the United States soon as India's largest trading partner, and Iran and India signed a $40 billion, 25-year contract with Iran to import natural gas and are planning a $7 billion natural gas pipeline from Iran to India.
Therefore, with so much at stake for nonproliferation, the Senate should be wary of passing a sweeping exception for India without more careful examination. Given the fruitful alternatives for continuing to strengthen our cooperation with India and the long-term costs of this proposed nuclear deal for U.S. and international security, Congress and the administration should seek to bring India into the nuclear nonproliferation framework in a way that strengthens international law and nuclear nonproliferation rather than undercuts these vital norms that underpin U.S. security.
