US-India Nuclear Deal
The proposed US-India nuclear deal poses great risks for the nuclear non-proliferation framework which has limited the spread of nuclear weapons over thirty-five years. The US-India nuclear deal set a dangerous precedent and rewards India despite its refusal to take on meaningful nuclear non-proliferation commitments as have done almost all other countries. The US-India nuclear deal vote also comes at a time when the United States is seeking to convince Iran to give up its nuclear weapons capability, and only weeks after the United States sanctioned two companies in India for exporting material and technology to Iran that could help Iran develop weapons of mass destruction.
Key facts
The proposed US-India nuclear deal poses great risks for the nuclear non-proliferation framework which has limited the spread of nuclear weapons over thirty-five years. The US-India nuclear deal set a dangerous precedent and rewards India despite its refusal to take on meaningful nuclear non-proliferation commitments as have done almost all other countries. The US-India nuclear deal vote also comes at a time when the United States is seeking to convince Iran to give up its nuclear weapons capability, and only weeks after the United States sanctioned two companies in India for exporting material and technology to Iran that could help Iran develop weapons of mass destruction.
Background
The US-Indian nuclear agreement that President Bush announced on July 18, 2005 stems from the United States’ desire to counter a rising China, facilitate the expansion of nuclear power, and strengthen US-Indian ties.
In exchange for the United States’ allowing the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology and conventional weapons to India, India promises to continue the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, to separate its civilian and military nuclear programs and not to transfer the nuclear technology to third parties. The agreement can become effective only if Congress agrees to modify restrictive laws put in place in response to the Indian nuclear weapons tests in 1974 and 1998, in an effort to prevent transfers of nuclear technology to states outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the context of considering this proposal, Congress has expressed concern about the implications for nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and India’s ties to Iran raising doubts about whether India will prove a reliable strategic partner.
In July 2006, the US House of Representatives voted in favor of bills to amend the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and allow the deal to move forward. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted in favor of the bill and a vote may occur in the full Senate in the next few weeks.
Both bills contain changes to the original July 2005 joint statement by Bush and Singh, enacting stricter conditions on India and eliciting outcry from the Indian side. The House passed the bill in July and the Senate will probably debate and vote on the issue in September.
Implications of the agreement
The agreement rewards bad behavior and allows India to significantly increase its number of nuclear weapons
By launching this initiative, the United States is rewarding India for developing nuclear weapons and reinforcing the perception that nuclear weapons confer prestige and power in the international arena and are necessary to become an influential power.
US assistance to India’s nuclear energy program will free up India’s limited resources for use in its weapons program. India would be able to build up to 50 nuclear weapons per year, as opposed to 6-12 weapons per year currently. The agreement would give India the ability to produce more nuclear weapons-usable material, which would put the United States at risk of violating Article 1 of the NPT.
Neither the original deal nor the Congressional bills require India to cap or limit its fissile material production. India is under no obligation to classify new reactors as civilian rather than military. There is no provision for returning fuel that India will receive under the agreement if India tests a nuclear weapon. There is no provision for preventing India from reprocessing spent fuel obtained under the agreement and produce plutonium that could be used in India’s military program if the agreement is terminated in any way by India.
The agreement creates a dangerous double-standard in the international community Double-standards that depend on the kind of government possessing weapons will weaken the nuclear non-proliferation framework that is founded on the wholesale prohibition of nuclear proliferation. We should not be making exceptions in our non-proliferation laws for countries that are currently allies of the United States. Instead, there should be a consistent policy when it comes to sensitive nuclear technology.
The agreement will open the door for other exceptions and justify further proliferation
Other states will likely consider the unilateral decision to reward India, despite its acquisition of nuclear weapons, as patently unfair and possibly seek similar exceptions. It appears hypocritical of the United States to deny North Korea and Iran nuclear programs and pressure countries such as Russia and China to support US policies while assisting India with its own program outside of the international framework.
Pakistan and China might accelerate their own programs, which could lead to an arms race in an already unstable South Asia.
The agreement undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
The unilateral reward to India provides an example that there may be a greater advantage in not joining the NPT than being a State Party to it. Certain non-nuclear weapons states are reconsidering adopting more binding non-proliferation obligations such as the Additional Protocol as a result of the US deal giving India a free pass. It is important for US security that the nuclear non-proliferation framework remain strong.
India remains unaccountable for secretly developing nuclear weapons
The deal has no provisions for significant concessions or sufficient guarantees from India that would justify nuclear cooperation and will yield very limited benefits for the United States. Without any sign of progress from India on rolling back its nuclear weapons program or making similar non-proliferation commitments that the recognized nuclear weapon states have made such as ceasing the production of bomb-grade material and signing the Comprehensive test Ban Treaty, the United States should not base its cooperation with India on the supply of sensitive nuclear technology.
In addition, in August 2006 the United States sanctioned two Indian companies that were involved in supplying Iran’s suspected weapons and missile programs (the other sanctioned companies were located in Cuba, North Korea and Russia). In the past years, other Indian companies and two nuclear India scientists were sanctioned for their business dealings with Iran involving materials and expertise that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction.
Recommendations
With regard to the US-India nuclear deal, the Administration and Congress should take steps to encourage India to take on meaningful non-proliferation commitments and come into compliance with internationally accepted nuclear non-proliferation norms. The United States should refrain from creating the condition that would assist India’s nuclear weapons program, hold the NPT viable and avoid creating a double standard.
The United States should seek further commitments from India and, at a minimum, require intermediary steps such as:
- Modify the agreement so that US cooperation only takes effect once India ceases or has committed to cease the production of fissile material (as have done the five recognized nuclear weapon states), and joins the multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) or a similar agreement.
- Prohibit the export of dual-use technology such as technology to make bomb-grade material.
- Encourage India to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or make a bilateral commitment not to test nuclear weapons (unless it is in response to US or Pakistani or Chinese testing).
- Offer significant technological assistance to India in areas other than nuclear technology. While energy may be a significant concern for India and concerns about climate warming are increasing, the United States could assist India to develop its substantial reserves of coal and share “clean coal” technology. Other meaningful bilateral cooperation should be based on India’s booming economy and its democratic government, rather than on nuclear issues.
News
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Summary of Debate on US-India Nuclear Trade Bill
On November 16, 2006, the US Senate debated and passed the US-India nuclear deal bill by a vote of 85 yeas to 12 nays (vote # 270). The bill exempts India from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. » Read more
